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Systemic risk, here meant as the risk of default of a large portion of the financial system, depends on the
network of financial exposures among institutions. However, there is no widely accepted methodology to
determine the systemically important nodes in a network. To fill this gap, we introduce, DebtRank, a novel
measure of systemic impact inspired by feedback-centrality. As an application, we analyse a new and unique
dataset on the USD 1.2 trillion FED emergency loans program to global financial institutions during 2008–
2010. We find that a group of 22 institutions, which received most of the funds, form a strongly connected
graphwhere each of the nodes becomes systemically important at the peak of the crisis.Moreover, a systemic
default could have been triggered even by small dispersed shocks. The results suggest that the debate on
too-big-to-fail institutions should include the even more serious issue of too-central-to-fail.
T
he characterization of the architecture of economic and financial networks is gaining increasing import-
ance1,2. Indeed, the recent economic turmoil has raised a broad awareness that the financial system should be
regarded as a complex network whose nodes are financial institutions and links are financial dependencies3.
In this perspective, systemic risk is meant here as the risk of a systemic default, i.e. the default of a large portion of
the financial system. It can be quantified andmeasured from the analysis of the dynamical evolution of the nodes
and from the structure of the network4–7. The main open question regarding financial networks concerns the
determination of the so-called ‘‘systemically important’’ financial institutions, namely, the ones that, if defaulting,
can trigger a systemic default and are thus to be considered ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’. From a network science perspective,
this question is related to the concept of recursive centrality measures such as eigenvector centrality and
PageRank. It is also related to the more general issue of the controllability of a complex network8. However,
the investigation of how financial networks function and how systemic risk emerges is only at the beginning. The
scarcity of data, due to confidentiality constraints, has limited so far the study to few national datasets9–12. The goal
of this paper is to show how network science can contribute to a quantitative assessment of systemic risk. To this
end, we analyse a unique and very relevant dataset by means of a novel indicator of systemic importance.
In theUS, the financial crisis reached a peak in the periodMarch 2008 -March 2010.During this time,manyUS
and international financial institutions received aid from the US Federal Reserve Bank (FED) through emergency
loans programs, including the so-called ‘‘FED Discount Window’’. The amount and the recipients of these loans
were not disclosed until very recently (see more details in Supplementary Information, SI, Section 1-2). This data
represents, to our knowledge, the first data set, publicly available, on the daily financial exposures between a
central bank and a large set of institutions over several months. The data was previously analysedmainly from the
point of view of accounting practice and conflicts of interests13. Here, we instead present an analysis from the
perspective of complex financial networks and systemic risk.
The contributions of this paper are the following. We first analyse the portfolio of loans granted by the FED
over time, both in terms of concentration and fragility. We then investigate the distribution of outstanding debt
across institutions and across time. We also combine the FED dataset with data on equity investment relations
among these institutions and we analyse the structure of the network of dependencies among the institutions that
received funding. Finally, in order to estimate the systemic importance of the various institutions, we introduce
Debt Rank. This is a novel measure, akin to feedback centrality, that takes into account in a recursive way the
impact of the distress of one or more institutions to their counterparties across the whole network.
Results
Credit concentration and fragility. We start our analysis of the dataset (see Methods) from the sum of the
outstanding debt across institutions, which represents the total exposure of the FED, i.e. its total potential loss in
case of default of the borrowers. This number rose very sharply in November of 2008, up to around USD 1.2
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trillion, fromwhere, in the following 12months, it steadily decreased
down to few billions (Fig. 1a). As a measure of concentration of the
credit portfolio, we compute the Herfindhal index, H, of the
outstanding debts (see Methods). As shown in Fig. 1, H remains
around 0.05, meaning that, despite the large variation in the size of
the exposure, the number of leading borrowers remained appro-
ximately around 20. What did not remain constant over time is the
fragility of the leading borrowers, defined as debt-to-equity ratio. The
weighted average, W(t), of the fragility, which reflects the fragility of
the largest borrowers, displays peaks in correspondance to the major
events, such as the Bear Sterns case (March of 2008) and the drop in
stock market value as of March of 2009 (Fig. 1b). Remarkably, when
the total exposure of the FED still amounted to 900 billions, the debt
of the leading borrowers was more than 6 times larger than their
market capitalization.
Debt distribution. The dataset provides a unique opportunity to
study the distribution of the outstanding debt across institutions
and across time. Based on the behaviour of the total FED exposure,
we divide the time span of the data into 3 phases (see caption Fig. 2a).
In principle, we could study the daily evolution of the distribution. In
practice, on a single day the number of institutions with debt to the
FED is not always large enough to reveal its underlying distribution.
To improve the statistics, we pool the values of debt over intervals of
30 days, after checking for the homogeneity of the debt time series
within those intervals (see also Sec. 2 of SI). As shown in the inset of
Fig. 2a, we choose ten representative such intervals so that each phase
is covered. Fig. 2a shows the complementary cumulative distribution
of outstanding debt, computed in each of the 30-day intervals. The
values of debt are rescaled by the total debt across institutions. The
hypothesis that the distribution of debt across institutions is a power
law is rejected by statistical tests in all periods (see also SI, Sec. 2.1).
This contrasts with what was found in previous studies on the
distribution of debt9,14, and more in general in various economic
contexts15,16. However, here we are in presence of emergency loans
for which not every firm is eligible. It is thus likely that small
institutions are under-represented in this dataset and that there is
also an upper limit on the loans, which would explain the observed
deviation from a power law (see also SI, Sec. 2).
Statistical tests suggest that the functional form of the distributions
is the same across periods and that their parameters are more similar
within the same market phase (see also SI, Sec. 2). This can be seen
also in Fig 2.a where the curves in blue and violet cluster together.
This is a remarkable finding, in particular during the third phase,
since the total amount of debt to the FED varied in time by almost
one order ofmagnitude (fromUSD 1200 billion in January of 2009 to
less than USD 200 billions in October of 2009). A trivial explanation
of the scaling behaviour would be that at each point in time the FED
lends to all institutions in the same proportion and that only the total
amount varies. The analysis of the outstanding debt pattern over time
across the top 100 borrowers, shown in Fig. 2b, rules out this explana-
tion. We find that although about 30 institutions reached their
respective peak of debt in the same period, many others had their
peak few months earlier or later. Moreover, while for some institu-
tions the debt declined rapidly, for others it declined slowly. Given
the heterogeneity across the debt patterns (Fig. 2b), the similarity of
the debt distributions seems to be an emerging property of the sys-
tem. Further evidence of this property comes from complementary
data on the FED balance sheet. We find that the equivalent amount
that was paid back by the institutions reappears on the FED balance
sheet as mortgage backed securities (see SI, Fig. 1b). This suggests
that as banks started to pay back their debt, the FED began to buy
from them the toxic assets which were at origin of the crisis (more
details in SI, Section 3).
Network analysis. In a network perspective, nodes represent
institutions, while directed edges represent lending relations weighted
by the amount of the outstanding debt. The network has a simple
structure (a star with the FED in the center, see also SI, Fig. 2a-11a),
although it is known that these institutions had also many financial
dependencies among each other. Indeed, it is part of the normal
business of financial firms to invest in other firms by utilizing
various lending mechanisms9–12 and by acquiring equity stakes
(although these forms of investment cannot be regarded as equi-
valent). Unfortunately, information on the former type of investment
is not available because of confidentiality issues, especially because
these are global firms from different countries. However, previous
work has shown that the equity investment network of transnational
corporations (TNC) has a bow-tie structure with financial firms in the
core forming a tightly connected structure3.
We thus match the FED dataset with data on equity investment
relations at the end of 2007 (i.e. at the beginning of the FED discount
Figure 1 | Exposure, concentration and fragility of the FED. (a) Plot over time of the total exposure of the FED (blue) and of Herfindhal index H of the
FED credit portfolio (in red). The effective number of borrowers is given by the reciprocal of H, which varies between 10 and 30. (b) Plot over time of the
total exposure of the FED (blue) and of fragility the FED credit portfolio (in red). The peaks correspond to major distress events. E.g., the rescue of Bear
Sterns in March of 2008, the Citigroup big losses (USD 2.8 billions) in October of 2008 and the market drop of March, 2009. Note that in this picture we
removed big peak in fragility caused by the shock of the Lehman and Brothers default (for more details see SI).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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window data time span). We then focus on the 22 institutions that
received, on average over the 10 periods, more than USD 5 billion.
The top borrowing institutions accounted, at the peak of the crisis,
for a total of USD 804 billion out of USD 1.2 trillion of funding.
Interestingly, all these institutions turn out to be in the core (i.e., the
largest strongly connected component) of the TNC network men-
tioned above. Moreover, the subnetwork of these 22 institutions is
itself strongly connected (which would not need to be true). This
means that each of the 22 institutions in the network can reach any
other via a directed path. The overwhelming majority of pairs of
nodes (99.1%) are at distance 1 or 2 from each other. The structure
is relatively homogeneous with a high density of connections. The
average out-degree and in-degree are, respectively, 12.1 6 5.7 and
12.1 6 3.2 (the average must coincide although the network is not
symmetric). The density of links is 0.58. The k-core analysis yields a
core number equal to 8 for all nodes except 3, with an average of 7.7.
This finding suggests, in the lack of alternative information, to take as
a proxy of the financial dependencies among institutions the network
of their mutual equity investments, appropriately normalised (see
Methods).
DebtRank and systemically important institutions. In order to
estimate the impact of a node on the others, we then introduce
DebtRank, a novel measure inspired by feedback centrality, that
takes recursively into account the impact of the distress of an initial
node across the whole network. DebtRank of node i, denoted as Ri, is
a number measuring the fraction of the total economic value in the
network that is potentially affected by the distress or the default of
node i (see Methods). DebtRank can be used to construct a ranking,
but it is not itself the rank of the node. Its computation differs from
the methods based on the default cascade dynamics11,12,17 in which,
below the threshold no impact is propagated to the neighbors18 (see
SI, Section 3.1). Feedback centrality measures19 have found successful
applications in many domains ranging from rankings in the world-
wide-web (e.g. PageRank) to corporate control in economic net-
works3. Feedback centrality has a physical analogy with the in-flow
in a non-homogeneous diffusion process (see SI, Section 3.1). In
presence of a cycle in the network there is an infinite number of
reverberations of the impact of a node to the others and back
to itself, which leads to no simple and measurable economic
interpretation. DebtRank overcomes this problem by only allowing
for walks that do not visit the same edge twice.
We apply the computation of DebtRank on the network of the 22
top borrowers of the FED by carrying out two experiments. In the
first one, for each node i, we compute DebtRank in the case of its
default (i.e., yi 5 1, see Methods). Notice that in the impact matrix
used by DebtRank we take into account the level of market capital-
ization of the nodes (see Methods), thus obtaining a set of values of
Ri in each period. The diagrams in Fig. 3 display the structure of the
network and allow, at the same time, to compare the values of
DebtRank of any pair of institutions. A high value of DebtRank
corresponds to a more central location of the node. Therefore, the
terms ‘‘DebtRank’’ and ‘‘centrality’’ will be used interchangeably in
the following. As it can be seen from the figure, at the peak of the
crisis all nodes became more central, meaning that the default of
each of them would cause a larger economic loss in the network.
Figure 4 shows instead how the DebtRank of each institution varies
with its total asset, relative to the sum of total assets in the network.
The color of the bubbles reflects the fragility of the institutions (i.e.
debt over equity ratio). We observe that towards the peak of the crisis
most institutions have high level of fragility and in addition high
values of DebtRank. This implies that each bank was more likely to
default on its own, and, moreover, that in case of default, it would
cause a larger loss. We find that even in a conservative scenario
Figure 2 | Distribution and temporal patterns of debt. (a) We split data into three phases: (1) Beginning of the crisis (from August, 2007 until April,
2008), where the FED’s exposure is below USD 20 billion; (2) Plateau (April, 2008 till October 2008), where the exposure raises and stays around 380
billion for 3 months; (3) Peak and decline (October, 2008 until April, 2010), where the exposure peaks in a short span of time and starts to decline at a
slower rate, due to a parallel toxic asset purchasing program (see SI, Section 3)We have chosen ten representative periods of 30 days, as shown in the inset.
For each period, debt values across days were pooled together in order to increase the statistics (under the assumption that such data are generated by the
same stochastic process). The main plot shows the empirical complementary cumulative distributions of outstanding debt, computed in each of the 10
periods. For each distribution, the values of debt are rescaled by the total debt across institutions in that period. Note that distributions within the same
phase look similar. (b) The debt of the top 100 institutions (by average debt) is represented as a topographicmapwhere the color indicates the debt of each
institution as a percentage of its ownmaximum debt: from green to yellow, to red (respectively, 0-30%, 30-70%, 70-100%). The institutions are sorted by
their peak date, from upper left to bottom: institutions having an earlier peak are in the upper left corner of the plot. The inset figure shows an histogram
counting howmany institutions were in their peak of debt during eachmonth. Note that in the worst case almost 30 institutions where in theirmaximum
level of debt at the same time, thus indicating a high degree of synchronicity.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Figure 3 | The network of the top borrowers. Nodes represent financial institutions (selected as explained in the text). Outgoing links represent the
estimated potential impact of an institution to another one (seeMethods). The nodes are positioned within a circle of radius 1, centred in 0. The distance
of each node from the center is 1{R Dð Þi , while the angle increases linearly with R(D) from 0 to 10p. Thus, the closer a node is to the center the higher is its
DebtRank (the intuition here is its centrality). A node in the center (DebtRank5 1) is able to put under distress the entire economic value of the network.
DebtRank decreases bymoving outwards and leftwards along the spiral. The diagram allows at the same time to visualise the structure of the network and
to compare the importance of any two given nodes. The size and the color of the node reflects the DebtRank value (larger and red nodes have higher
DebtRank). The color of a link reflects the DebtRank of the node from which it originates (red links originate from node with high DebtRank and make
high impact to the destination nodes). (a) Period one, at the beginning of the crisis (see also inset of Fig. 2a). Most of the nodes have low levels of
DebtRank, i.e., they are located close to the border. (b) Period four (peak of the crisis). Nodes have comparable levels of Debt Rank. However, they are also
much more central, i.e., they can impact a large fraction of the total economic value. A single default is likely to trigger a systemic failure.
Figure 4 | Debt Rank, asset size and fragility. Scatter plot of DebtRank versus asset size, measured as a fraction (in %) of the total of the asset size in the
network. For sake of simplicity, in the experiment, asset size was assumed constant during the time span of the data. Notice that institutions such as UBS,
or CITIGROUP alone account for almost 10% of the total assets. The size of each bubble is proportional to the outstanding debt of the institution while
the color reflects its fragility, defined as the ratio of debt over market capitalization in the given period, as in the previous section. (a) Period one. Since the
outstanding debt was very low or zero, most nodes appear small and have levels of DebtRank below 0.3, but comparable among each other. (b) Period
four. Many institutions have a Debt Rank larger then 0.5, i.e. each can impact, alone, the majority of the economic value in the network. The outstanding
debt in this period is close to the peak for all the institutions, as reflected by the size of the bubbles. Notice, also a higher fragility, most bubbles are red,
although with some heterogeneity.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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(e.g. we assume that in the first months of 2008 each bank had
enough core capital to withstand at least the default of 5 counter-
parties, a 5 0.2, see also Methods), most of the 22 institutions
become very systemically important at the peak of the crisis
(Fig. 3b). In period 1, all institutions have a DebtRank below 0.25
with an average value of 0.08 6 0.06 (Fig. 4a) and are not very central
(Fig. 3a). In contrast, in period 4 (average 0.52 6 0.20), many insti-
tutions are able, alone, to affect more than the 70% of the total value
in the network (Fig. 4b), despite the fact that in terms of asset size
they represent less than 10% of the total.
In the second experiment, we compute DebtRank in the situation
in which none of the nodes in the network defaults initially but all are
at levely, 1 of distress (seeMethods).We refer to this case as Group
DebtRank. We find that the initial shocks always generate an impact
larger than the shocks themselves even in the periods preceding the
peak of the crisis. For instance, with y 5 0.1, i.e. an initial shock of
10%, the total loss varies across periods from aminimum of 22% to a
maximum of 65% (see SI, Section 3.6). Notice, that the mechanism
differs from the contagion found in epidemic spreading20 and other
contact processes. Here, the impact of an institution i to another, j,
depends both on the relative exposure of j to i and on the ratio
between such exposure and the capital buffer of i (see Methods). It
follows that the impact of i over j can be larger then the relative
exposure of j to i (the impact matrix is not column stochastic).
Indeed, financial institutions, by seeking for profit, tend to be highly
leveraged, i.e., to have small capital compared to total assets. This is
how the system can end up in a situation in which a small loss can
cause a systemic default.
It is important to emphasise that there is more to DebtRank than
size. The correlation between asset size and DebtRank is always
lower than 0.4 and decreases towards the peak of the crisis (see SI,
Section 3.7). We have also compared DebtRank with the measures of
systemic importance obtained both with the default cascade
dynamics and with two feedback centralities, including the classic
eigenvector centrality. In a nutshell, all measures differ in the timing
and in the magnitude of their response. Although the ranking pro-
vided by the four measures are similar (implying that these measures
are consistent among each other), DebtRank is the only one that
delivers a clear response well before the peak of the crisis (see SI, Sec.
3.5). This feature makes it a better candidate as a possible early-
warning indicator. Moreover, DebtRank has the precise meaning
of economic loss, measured in dollars, caused by the distress or
default of a node.
Discussion
In this paper, we presented the first complex networks analysis of the
controversial FED emergency program dataset. We find that, while
the number of leading borrowers to the FED only varied between 10
and 30, the fragility of the portfolio reflected closely the major events
of distress in the market. We also find that the distribution of debt
across institutions has the same functional form over time. In order
to estimate the systemic importance of a node, or a group of nodes,
we introduce DebtRank, a novelmetric that, similar to PageRank and
other feedback centrality measures, takes into account recursively all
the paths in the network. However, differently from these, DebtRank
avoids the infinite reverberation by excluding the walks in which
edges are repeated. By matching the FED data with data on equity
investments relations in the same period, we find that the largest
borrowers were interconnected in a dense network. Each of them
was very central and could impact significantly every other node in
only one or two steps. Moreover, we find that a small shock to the
system as whole could get amplified by the many paths in the net-
work into a systemic default. These findings should be regarded
with caution since the network of impact used for the experiments
is a proxy of the real, unknown, one. However they demonstrate
what kind of insights can be gained with our methodology. The work
contributes to the understanding of financial networks, but the
methodology is relevant to the field of Complex Networks in general,
since it can be applied to detect systemically important nodes in any
directed and weighted network.
The methodology is also relevant to a broader audience of regula-
tors and risk management practitioners since it provides a quantitat-
ive assessment of the systemically important financial institutions. In
this respect, our results suggest that the current public discussion on
too-big-to-fail institutions should be broadened to the network-
theory notion of too-central-to-fail, so to account for the existence
of densely connected cores in financial networks.
Methods
Data.Data consists of daily time series of outstanding debt and market capitalization
of 407 institutions in a period of 1004 days spanning from August 2007 to June 2010.
Outstanding debt refers here to the amount owed by an institution to the FED as a
result of the emergency loans granted by the FED via the so-called DiscountWindow
and various emergency programs. This means that these were loans for which the
FED was lender-of-last-resort. The dataset analysed here is the one released by
Bloomberg after consolidating the original dataset released by the FED. We have also
obtained and analysed the original dataset (for more information, see SI Section 1).
This data is unique since information on this kind of loans were never disclosed
before. In addition, they refer to the crucial phase of the financial crisis. The data on
equity investment were obtained from the Orbis Database of Bureau Van Dijk and
were analysed in a previous study3. They include the equity shares owned by a firm in
another one in the last quarter of 2007.
Credit portfolio concentration. The Herfindhal index is a common measure of size
concentration. In our context, we define it as
H tð Þ~
P n
i~1di tð Þ2P
n
i~1di tð Þð Þ2
, ð1Þ
where di(t) denotes the outstanding debt of borrower i at time t. When the debt is
equally distributed among n institutions, H 5 1/n. In contrast, when all the
institutions except one have zero debt, then H 5 1. Thus, the inverse of H is a
measures of the number of leading borrowers. For instance, in the case of 3
institutions with debt values equal to 0.8, 0.1, 0.1, the Herfindhal index isH 5 0.82 1
0.12 1 0.12 5 0.66 and H21 5 1.5.
The higher the debt (relative to the market capitalization of an institution), the
weaker it is the institution, financially speaking. Thus, the ratio wi(t) 5 di/ei captures
its financial fragility at time t. The following weighted average gives then ameasure of
fragility of the entire FED credit portfolio:
W tð Þ~
P
n
i~1wi tð Þdi tð ÞP
n
i~1di tð Þ
, ð2Þ
The debt-weighted average ensures that the fragility values of the institutions with
larger debt count more.
DebtRank. Methodology. We introduce a directed network in which the nodes
represent institutions and the links represent financial dependencies. We denote the
amount invested by i in the funding of j as Aij. Thus, A is the weighted adjacency
matrix of the investment network. The total value of the asset invested by i in funding
activities is Ai 5 SlAil. We denote by Ei the capital of i (more precisely, the so-called
‘‘tier 1 capital’’), which represents the capital buffer of i against shocks11,12. When
Ei # c the firm defaults, where c is a positive threshold. Further details on the
structure of the balance sheet in relation to a financial network can be found in
previous work17. If the node i defaults, the node j faces a loss of Aji (we exclude, in the
short run, any recovery of the assets invested in i), and the node j also defaults if
Aji. Ej. We will account later on for the case of the node j not defaulting but going
only under distress. We define the impact of i on j asWij 5 min{1, Aji/Ej}. Thus, if the
loss exceeds capital, the impact is 1. Notice that the matrix W is, in general, neither
column-stochastic nor row-stochastic. We further take into account the economic
value of the impact of i on j by multiplying the impact by the relative economic value
of the node j, vj 5Aj/SlAl (other proxies could be taken for vj). The value of the impact
of i on its neighbours is then Ii 5SjWijvj. Itmeasures the fraction of economic value in
the network that is impacted by i directly.
We now want to take into account the impact of i on its indirect successors, that is, the
nodes that can be reached from i and are at distance 2 ormore. In analogy to the feedback
centrality we could define the impact in terms of the following recursive equation
Ii 5 SjWijvj 1 bSjWijIj, where the second term accounts for the indirect impact via the
neighbours. The parameter b , 1 is a dampening factor. In vector notation, we have
I 5 Wv 1 bWI, which yields I~ I{bWð Þ{1Wv~
X
?
k~0 b
kWk
 
Wv, as long as the
largest eigenvalue of W is smaller than 1/b.
One result of the graph theory is that in the power k of the adjacency matrix the
element ij amounts to the number of walks of length k from i to j. In the case of a
weighted matrix, it amounts to a sum across the walks of length k from i to j of the
product of theweights along eachwalk15. Longer walks contribute less to the centrality
because of the dampening factor bk. However, if two nodes i and j are connected in a
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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cycle (Wij. 0 andWji. 0), the impact of node i to j hits back on i and keeps cycling
an infinite number of times (although with dampening). A single reverberation of the
impact of i back to itself is realistic and mathematically acceptable. Further rever-
berations lead instead to an inconsistency because the impact could become larger
than one. The reason is that if the impact walks its way several times through a cycle,
then we are counting the impact of a node on another one more than once. The same
problem applies also to any cycle not involving i, but located downstream of i in the
network. Removing the cycles altogether from the network and considering its cor-
responding acyclic graph would remove entirely the reverberation and cut many
links, thus strongly underestimating the impact.
In contrast, in this paper, we propose the following approach.We keep the network
as it is, but we exclude the walks in which one or more edges are repeated. A con-
venient way to do this (a sufficient condition) is to introduce the following process. To
each node we associate two state variables. hi is a continuous variable with hig [0, 1].
Instead, si is a discrete variable with 3 possible states, undistressed, distressed, inactive:
sig {U,D, I}. Denoting by Sf the set of nodes in distress at time 1, the initial conditions
are: hi(1) 5 y ig Sf ; hi 1ð Þ~0 V i 6[ Sf , and si(1) 5 D, ;ig Sf ; si 1ð Þ~U V i 6[ Sf .
The parameterymeasures the initial level of distress:yg [0, 1], withy5 1meaning
default. The dynamics is defined as follows,
hi tð Þ~min 1, hi t{1ð Þz
X
j
Wjihj t{1ð Þ
( )
, where j sj t{1ð Þ~D,
 ð3Þ
si tð Þ~
D if hi tð Þw0; si t{1ð Þ=I
I if si t{1ð Þ~D
si(t{1) otherwise,
8<
: ð4Þ
for all i and for t.52, where all variables hi are first updated in parallel, followed by
un update in parallel of all variables si. After a finite number of steps T the dynamics
stops and all the nodes in the network are either in stateU or I. The intuition is that a
nodes goes in distress when a predecessor just went in distress and so recursively. The
fraction of propagated distress is given by the impact matrixWij. BecauseWij# 1 the
longer the path from the node i initially in distress and node j, the smaller is the
indirect impact on j. Notice that a node that goes in theD state, will move to the I state
one step later. This means that if there is a cycle of length 2 the node will not be able to
propagate impact to its successor more than once. This condition satisfies the
requirement, mentioned earlier, of excluding the walks in which an edge is repeated.
An illustration on a simple example is provided in the SI, Section 3.2.1.
The DebtRank of the set Sf is then defined as
R~
P
j
hj Tð Þvj{
P
j
hj 1ð Þvj, ð5Þ
i.e., Rmeasures the distressed induced in the system, excluding the initial distress. If Sf
is a single node the DebtRank measures the systemic impact of the node on the
network. In this case, it is of interest to set y 5 1 and to see the impact of a defaulting
node. If Sf is a set of nodes it can be interesting to compute the impact of a small shock
on the group. Indeed, while it is trivial that the default of a large groupwould cause the
default of the whole network, it is not trivial to anticipate the effect of a little distress
acting on the whole group.
DebtRank. Empirical application. The values of the credit exposures are unknown.
However, the values of investments of each node j in the equity of i, Zji, are available.
We then take them as a starting point to construct a proxy of the impact of node i. We
normalise their values, ~Wij~
ZjiP
lZjl
. We further rescale them with respect to the
maximumbymeans of an impact scaling factor, denoted as a# 1,Wij~a
~Wij
maxl ~Wlj
 .
In this way, the maximum impact on j across the nodes l equals a. For instance if a 5
0.2, j can withstand the default of 1/0.2 5 5 or more counterparties before defaulting
itself: a quite conservative scenario. Notice that the value a 5 0.2 is the average ratio
Aji/Ei that was observed at the end of 2007 in the Brazilian interbank network, the only
case for which this information is published or accessible11. Therefore, we also run the
experiments with a 5 0.2. One could of course investigate other values of a.
Moreover, a could also be made heterogeneous. Finally, we want to account for the
fact that the market capitalization of the largest borrowers on the stock market
decreased significantly in the first half of the time span of the data. We do so by
rescaling the impact of a node on another accordingly, with the constraint that it does
not exceed one. The final expression used for the impact is therefore,
Wij~min 1, a
~Wij
maxl ~Wlj
  Ej 1ð Þ
Ej tð Þ
( )
.
Bow-tie. A bow-tie architecture is a directed graph consisting of the following parts.
The core is a strongly connected component (SCC). The IN consists of all nodes that
can reach the SCC directly or indirectly via one or more directed paths. The OUT
consists of all nodes that can be reached from the SCC directly or indirectly via one or
more directed path. The Tubes and Tendrils (TT) consist of all nodes that are not in
the SCC and are either reachable from the IN or/and can reach the OUT.
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